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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 8989 
:MARY VAT SIS, 
Appella!nt. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
(The parties will be referred to as they appeared in 
the trial court. Tr. refers to the pages of the Reporter's 
Transcript. R. refers to that portion of the Record con-
sisting of papers filed in the Clerk's office.) 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of 
conviction (R. 76) entered upon a jury's verdict of guilty 
of the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses 
(R. 59). 
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The case went to trial on an information (R. 15) 
which was amended during the course of the trial (R. 57, 
Tr. 134) and in which it was alleged that defendant ob-
tained a check from the Commercial Credit Corporation 
by "representing and selling'' to Commercial Credit 
Corp. "a fraudulent Conditional Sales Contract" purport-
edly entered into between Ann Troulis and the V & H 
Motor Company "which Conditional Sales Contract was 
fraudulent and forged." 
The State filed a Bill of Particulars (R. 20) in which 
it specified the conduct of defendant Mary V atsis relied 
upon to establish the defense: 
"Mary Vatsis signed the name 'Ann Troulis' 
to the contract without authority and with intent 
to aid her husband and co-defendant to obtain 
money by false pretences." 
Mary V atsis was charged jointly with her husband. 
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the action 
against him because of the absolute lack of evidence tend-
ing in any way to establish his guilt of the offense. The 
State, in detailing his conduct in the Bill of Particulars 
(R. 20) stated as follows: 
"He was a principal in the execution of a 
fraudulent contract. He acknowledged that one 
Ann Troulis purchased a car frmn hin1, which was, 
in fact, false and which fraudulent signature he 
was aware of." 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Commercial Credit Corporation was in the business 
of purchasing Conditional Sales Contracts on automo-
biles (Tr. 11). The V & H Motor Company was an auto-
mobile dealership in Price, Utah. It sold its contracts to 
Commercial Credit. The office manager of Commercial 
Credit testified in dealing with that concern he dealt with 
both the defendant and her husband John (Tr. 11). Leon 
Green, unit manager for Commercial Credit, testified 
he ordinarily dealt with John and very seldom with de-
fendant Mary (Tr. 44). As a matter of fact the V & H 
Motor Company was John V atsis doing business under 
that name. The defendant only worked there. 
The contracts would be submitted by the dealer to 
the Commercial Credit Corporation and it, in turn, would 
investigate the purchaser's credit, etc., and would then 
issue a check to the dealer (Tr. 11). John or defendant 
Mary would either mail the contract in or bring it in 
personally (Tr. 12). The charge here is founded upon a 
Conditional Sales Contract on a 1956 Buick automobile 
(Exhibit 1). The contract was dated March 9, 1957 and 
the V & H Motor Company by John V atsis appears there-
in as the Seller and Ann Troulis as the Buyer (Tr. 13). 
Commercial Credit purchased the contract on March 
12, 1957, and paid the sum of $2,175.00 for it (Tr. 13). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The check issued was in the amount of $6,700.00 and in-
cluded other contracts (Tr.15, Exhibit 3). The check was 
endorsed and paid (Tr.15). The check was given to John 
Vatsis (Tr. 129). 
This same Buick was floor planned by V & H Motor 
Company with Commercial Credit Corporation on AprjJ 
4, 1957 (Tr. 21). 
As indicated, the State's case is based upon the prop-
osition that the contract was forged. The only two per-
sons who could testify concerning this matter were Ann 
Troulis and Mary V atsis. Ann Troulis did not testify 
that she did not authorize 1fary Vatsis to sign her name 
to the contract. Mary V atsis testified very definitely that 
authority was given to her to sign the name of Ann 
Troulis to the contract (Tr. 146, 156). We will discuss 
this phase of the testimony under the Argument in the 
brief. 
STATE1fENT OF POINTS 
POINT L 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT OF GUILTY. . 
POINT II. 
THE 'TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUC-
TION NO.3. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT OF GUILTY. 
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Inasmuch as the charge was necessarily based upon 
the forgery of the contr.act we will discuss the absolute 
lack of any evidence to show forgery. 
Ann Troulis testified that on or about March 8, 1957, 
she discussed with Mary Vatsis the purchase of an auto-
moblie (Tr. 57). Included in this discussion was whether 
or not Miss Troulis could afford an automobile. She 
testified that she indicated to defendant to go 
ahead and take whatever steps were necessary to effect 
the financing of the automobile. She left it up to the de-
fendant to take care of the details ('Tr. 57). During this 
conversation they talked about making out a contract for 
Miss Troulis to get an automobile. Within a short period 
of time thereafter Miss Troulis called defendant on the 
phone to inform her that she couldn't afford to pay for 
the automobile and the deep freeze and therefore she 
wanted to cancel the contract which had been made up 
for the purchase of the car (Tr. 57, 58). She definite-
ly testified that after the contract had been made she 
changed her mind and told defendant to cancel it ( Tr. 58). 
After the foregoing was disclosed on cross examina-
tion, the prosecutor took over and was given permission 
to cross examine Miss Troulis on the grounds she was a 
hostile witness. She testified as follows: 
"Q. Didn't you authorize Mary Vatsis to sign your 
signature to that contract~ 
A. I can't answer yes or no to that. 
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Q. You know whether you did or not, don't you1 
Miss Troulis ~ 
A. I can't remember. I maybe did. 
Q. Do you think you did~ 
A. I may have. 
Q. Do you think you authorized her to sign your 
name to that contract~ 
A. I may have." (Tr. 59, 60) 
Apparently there is an error in the transcript be-
cause the testimony referred to in the preliminary hear-
ing undoubtedly was that Miss Troulis did not tell de-
fendant she could use her name, but, in any event, she 
explained the reason for any change in testimony as 
follows: 
"A. I answered 'no' because I was afraid that if 
I answered in any other way I would be im-
plicated in this and because I have more or 
less been-well, I have been bull-dozed by fl 
few people so far as this contract and things 
like that are concerned." (Tr. 60, 61) 
Miss Troulis was told that if she did not sign a state-
ment implicating defendant she would end up paying for 
the car ('Tr. 62). Under cross exanrination of the prose-
cutor she testified: 
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"Q. You may have authorized her to sign your 
signature to a contract~ 
A. I may have. I am not saying I did and I am 
not saying I didn't." (Tr. 63) 
She then testified : 
"A. I am implying that from my last testimony I 
said, 'No, I didn't give her permission to use 
my name,' and I have thought about it and I 
was afraid - I haven't been mixed up in 
anything like this before - and I came up 
here with the thought I would be mixed up in 
getting a car I didn't know anything about 
and I just felt my only answer was to say 
'no' because I was afraid and I had been 
threatened." (Tr. 63) 
She then testified concerning authorization to sign 
the contract: 
"Q. You didn't authorize her to use your signa-
ture, did you~ 
A. I may have. I talked to her a lot of times 
about my getting a car. 
Q. What did you authorize her to use your signa-
ture for, signing checks, buyfng a car or what~ 
A. I guess on a contract. 
Q. For what~ 
A. A car, I was planning on buying a car." (Tr. 
63, 64) 
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Further testimony of Miss Troulis reveals the fol-
lowing: 
"Q. Here is the point I am getting at : You told 
Mr. Hansen you called Mrs. V atsis up and 
told her to cancel the contract. You tell me 
what contract you told her to cancel. 
A. The one she was supposed to have made out. 
Q. Which one~ 
A. The contract we talked about when she was 
at my house. 
Q. Which contract~ 
A. For a car. 
Q. What car~ 
A. Whichever one I tried out. I don't know." 
(Tr. 67, 68) 
Concerning cancellation she testified: 
"Q. How did you know what you were cancellingT 
A. I knew because we had talked about it and 
I just felt to 1nyself I didn't want to try pay-
ing for son1ething else until I paid off the 
freezer so I called and told her that." 
She then testified: 
"Q. But you didn't buy any other car or sign any 
other contracts nor did you authorize anyone 
to sign a contract for you. did you~ 
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A. I don't know whether I did or not. I may have. 
Q. Your testimony in December would be more 
reliable than it is today~ 
A. No, because since December I have thought 
and thought about it and it's bothered me be-
cause when I came up here-and I was really 
afraid because that was after I had been more 
or less threatened by Commercial Credit and 
I felt any other explanation I tried to make 
other than 'yes' or 'no,' I would get stuck with 
a Buick." (Tr. 68) 
In her testimony Miss Troulis refused to testify that 
her name had been signed to the contract in question 
without her authority. Inasmuch as the charge was based 
on the supposed misrepresentation resulting from pass-
ing a forged contract, this ended the State's case. 
Defendant recalled this sale and testified she talked 
with Ann Troulis at the Sooklaris home on the evening 
of March 8 (Tr. 146). They discussed the purchase of 
the 1956 Buick. Defendant did not have any contract 
forms with her and she explained to Ann how the contract 
could be executed and "when I left I was under the im-
pression that she was buying the car and that I had her 
authority to sign her name." She also testified: 
"Q. Is it your position that you sold the automo-
bile, a 1956 Buick automobile, to Ann Troulis ~ 
A. That is right. 
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Q. It was an actual, genuine sale~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And she authorized you to sign her name to 
the contract~ 
A. Yes." (Tr. 156) 
Miss Troulis later cancelled this contract and on 
March 13, defendant called Commercial Credit and talked 
to Leon Green. She told him not to process the contract 
because Ann had told her that she had better pay off the 
deep freeze and not a car. V & H Motor Company had 
already received the check from Commercial Credit at 
this time (Tr. 146, 147). 
State v. Howd, 55 Utah 527, 188 P. 628, (1920) and 
State v. T~mmerman, 88 Utah 481, 55 P. 2d 1320 (1936) 
have set forth the elements necessary to make out the 
crime of obtaining money by false pretenses. They are (1) 
a false or fraudulent representation (2) made knowing it 
to be such (3) with intent to cheat or defraud the person 
to whom the representation was made. ( ±) An actual 
fraud must have to be perpetrated in the sense that some-
thing of value was obtained and the victim lost something 
of value. ( 5) The representation must have induced the 
owner to part with his property in the sense that the own-
er parted with his property in reliance upon the truth 
of the representation. 
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By the .Amended Information as limited by the BiU 
of Particulars, it was necessary that the State establish 
that the contract with Ann Troulis was forged. We sub-
mit the foregoing evidence will not support a finding of 
forgery and hence, defendant's Motion for Directed V er-
dict should have been granted. 
This failure on the part of the State's proof, also 
eliminates other elements of this offense. If there was no 
forgery, the contract assigned to defendant was enforce-
able against Miss Troulis. In this respect Commercial 
Credit obtained that which it bargained for and hence, 
an essential element was not present which required a 
directed verdict. State v. Casperson, 71 Utah 68, 262 P. 
294 (1927) ; State v. Fisher, 79 Utah 115, 8 P.2d 589 
(1932); State v. ~lVlorris, 85 Utah 10, 38 P.2d 1097 (1934). 
The fact that a certificate of title was not delivered 
to Commercial Credit was of no importance here because 
in the ordinary course of events that would not be deliver-
ed for 30 to 60 days and the Commercial Credit did not 
expect title when the money was paid for the contract, 
but expected it to be delivered in the future (Tr. 23). 
The sale of this contract could only imply a promise to 
deliver a certificate of title in the future. Failure to de-
liver the title as promised could only result in a breach 
of contract and upon it could not be based a criminal com-
plaint for fraud. Such a promise is not a misrepresenta-
tion of a material existing fact. ~ee St,ate v. H owd, 55 
Utah 527, 188 P. 628 (1920). 
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In the H owd case, supra, the defendant sold the 
cattle of one Foy to Adams and Consley, and gave to 
Foy an insufficient funds check. The court stated con-
cerning this transaction which is analagous to the one 
presented in the case at bar: 
"The testimony is absolutely clear that no 
actual fraud was intended or perpetrated in this 
state. All that can be gathered from the record 
of the testimony is to the effect that defendant 
purchased Foy's cattle at Thompsons, Utah, that 
he there paid to Foy a part of the purchase price, 
and promised to pay the balance upon the arrival 
of the cattle at Grand Junction, Colo., a promise 
to be performed in the future. This was a very 
ordinary and perfectly legitimate transaction, and 
one that would not legally justify any inference 
of an intention to cheat or defraud Mr. Foy out 
of his property. Let it be conceded, although it is 
not shown from the testimony, that the defendant 
did not intend to pay for the cattle upon their 
arrival at Grand Junction, yet his representation 
that he would pay was purely promissory in char-
acter, and therefore may not be held as a fraudu-
lent representation or false pretense in the legal 
meaning or acceptance of the terms." 
Also, in its case at bar, the testilnony will not support 
a finding that there was an~~ intent on behalf of defendant 
to cheat or defraud anyone. 
In the Bill of Particulars as heretofore set forth, it 
appears that the position of the State was that defendant 
Mary Vatsis aided and abetted John Yatsis in the perpe-
tration of the crhue of obtaining n1oney by false pre-
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tenses. A Motion to Dismiss at the close of the State's 
case was granted as far as John Vatsis is concerned and 
this should also have resulted in the now defendant Mary 
V atsis being dismissed, or certainly a directed verdict 
granted. 
There is absolutely no evidence that Mary Vatsis 
ever, at any time, presented this contract or received 
any money from Commercial Credit. 
We submit that under the evidence produced by the 
State it constituted error for the trial court to deny de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict and, therefore, 
this case should be reversed. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUC-
TION NO.3. 
Instruction No. 3 set forth the elements which, if the 
State proved them, would justify the jury in returning 
a verdict of guilty. 
The fundamental error in this instruction is that it 
departed from the charge as contained in the Amended 
Information and the Bill of Particulars. No place in this 
instruction was it required that the State prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the contract in question was forged. 
It uses the words "bona fide sale" and "fictitious con-
tract." There is no evidence which would permit the 
presentation of any such issue to the jury. 
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The instruction is general in that it uses only the 
foregoing language and there is no definition of its terms. 
What does the word "fictitious" mean~ In the ordin-
ary sense of the word in criminal law, it is used to de-
scribe a situation where person uses a name which is not 
his own or that of any known person; hence, the check 
or obligation is known as fictitious. No such situation 
existed in the case at bar. State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 
136 P.2d 949. 
The use of the words "bona fide sale" is also confus-
ing. If this contract involved in this case was not forged, 
then it was enforceable against Ann Troulis and if it was 
enforceable against Ann Troulis this would not constitute 
the offense of obtaining money by false pretences be-
cause ·Commercial Credit would have received a contract 
which was enforceable and, therefore, would have obtain-
ed that for which it bargained, as indicated by the cases 
cited under Point I herein. 
This instruction is indicative of the fact that the trial 
court must have felt the State had utterly failed to pro-
duce evidence which would support a finding of forgery 
and, therefore, sought to change the charge. 
This instruction is also bad because there is no evi-
dence which would support a finding that the contract 
was either fictitious or did not constitute a bona fide 
sale. We have heretofore indicated why it is that it is 
not fictitious. If this contract were enforceable it would 
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of necessity be a bona fide sale and whether or not it is 
enforceable goes back to the old proposition of whether 
or not a forgery in fact, was committed. 
Subparagraph 1 of this instruction requires a finding 
that Mary V atsis presented to Commercial Credit the 
conditional sales contract signed by Ann Troulis. There 
is no evidence that Mary Vatsis ever presented this con-
ditional sales contract to the Commercial Credit or that 
she had anything to do with the transaction with Com-
mercial Credit. 
We submit that this departure from the charge con-
tained in the .Amended Information and Bill of Particu-
lars constituted prejudicial error, it was further preju-
dicial because the evidence did not support the giving of 
such instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit the State failed to introduce 
evidence which would permit a jury to find the contract 
in question was forged. We further submit the trial 
court was aware of this deficiency in the State's evidence 
and in order to make a presentable case, departed from 
the charge set forth in the Amended Information and 
the Bill of Particulars which required forgery, and gave 
the jury an instruction in the field of fictitious contracts 
and bona fide sales. We submit that in departing thusly 
the court committed prejudicial error to the rights of 
the defendant in this case. 
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We respectfully pray that the court reverse the ver-
dict and judgment of ~conviction and order that a direct-
ed verdict in favor of the defendant be entered, or in the 
event this is not done, that the case be reversed for a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
By BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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